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While social media analysis has been widely utilized to predict various market 
and political trends, its utilization to improve geospatial conflict prediction in contested 
environments remains understudied. To determine the feasibility of social media 
utilization in conflict prediction, we compared historical conflict data and social media 
metadata, utilizing over 829,537 geo-referenced messages sent through the Twitter 
network within Iraq from August 2013 to July 2014. From our research, we conclude that 
social media metadata has a positive impact on conflict prediction when compared with 
historical conflict data. Additionally, we find that utilizing the most extreme negative 
terminology from a locally derived social media lexicon provided the most significant 
predictive accuracy for determining areas that would experience subsequent violence. We 
suggest future research projects center on improving the conflict prediction capability of 
social media data and include social media analysis in operational assessments. 
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Social media continues to evolve as a means of sentiment sharing, 
communication, and social interaction. The interconnectedness of population groups 
continues to grow with the advancement of mobile device technology and the 
accessibility of Internet communication infrastructures.1 This medium provides a 
constant flow of social tendencies throughout 37 percent of the world’s population, which 
are not limited to benign subjects but also include radical leanings and other forms of 
social unrest.2 Analyzing social media trends in key locations of strategic concern could 
provide an additional tool for conflict prediction.3 Additionally, examining the 
relationship between social media sentiments and violent events could allow decision 
makers to be proactive and less reactionary. 
Why is this important? Human domain dynamics constantly shift, so the 
requirement to seek new and inventive ways to gather intelligence on those shifts is 
imperative. Moreover, the environments where human intelligence is needed most are 
often the hardest to access physically. The lack of real-time human intelligence in 
locations with limited access is therefore a serious problem. However, advances in 
communication technology have also produced new means for maintaining situational 
awareness. This research seeks to provide insight into human sentiment through social 
media analysis as a viable solution to this problem. Once we understand the relationship 
between sentiment and violence in a particular conflict, we can operationalize solutions 
to curb the occurrence of violence through conflict resolution.  
                                                 
1 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, December 2012). 
2 “Acting Social Network Penetration in Selected Countries as of January 2017,” Statista, 2017, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/269615/social-network-penetration-by-region/. 
3 T. Camber Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence: Political Conflict Discourse and the 
Emergence of Identity Radicalization in Nigerian Social Media” (presentation, Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, Sept. 3–6, 2015), 6. 
 2 
Previous thesis research at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) revealed a 
correlation between polling data and Twitter semantic analysis within Yemen.4 This 
research discovered that “social media data, when combined with polling, has a positive 
impact on analysis” and could be a “reliable source of stand-alone data for evaluating 
popular support under certain conditions.”5 To build on this research area and 
operationalize this data analysis method, further research should specifically focus on 
whether semantic trends occurred before significant violent events. Additionally, this 
research breaks new ground by seeking to predict violence in an active conflict zone, 
through the use of locally-derived lexicons. We propose that the inclusion of locally-
derived lexicons will likely provide a more accurate method for future research, 
especially in areas where Arabic is the dominant language. 
Thus, this study focuses on answering the research question, How can social 
media analysis be used as a tool for predicting violent events and understanding social 
sentiment during violent events? Through the analysis of social media metadata and 
historical databases of violent events, this paper examines the relationship between 
population sentiments and violent events in Iraq from August 1, 2013, through July 31, 
2014. We hypothesize that shifts in social media content tend to occur before violent acts 
take place. If a predictive relationship is found through analysis between social media 
metadata and historical databases of violent acts in Iraq, the study could provide political 
and military leaders a new method of conflict prediction and therefore increase situational 
awareness and response time at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Accurate 
knowledge of an operational environment is an intelligence requirement for every 
military commander. If this knowledge can be used to predict friendly and enemy actions, 
this can enable forces to posture more effectively in preparation for those actions, and 
allow commanders to respond more appropriately.  
                                                 
4 Andrew K. Bourret, Joshua D. Wines, and Jason M. Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS AND MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Social media is increasingly spreading to every part of the world and, by 2015, 
accounted for 31 percent of smartphone data consumption.6 Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram and other Internet based companies are experiencing record growth outside of 
Western countries. The attractiveness of this capability is due to many things, but surely 
due to the freedom of voicing an opinion in relative safety and anonymity. Despite 
locations where government control extends into the social media realm, personal and 
group leanings through this medium have become relatively common throughout the 
world. 
The commonality in social expression and the desire to express personal leanings 
and be connected to a larger social group through the cellular medium continue to 
expand. For example, both Twitter and Instagram are in the top 20 most-visited websites 
in the world according to the Alexa ranking.7 Twitter currently has 313 million monthly 
users, and over 75 percent of those users exist outside the continental United States.8 
These broad based services provide a significant cross section of the “wired” planet and 
can be analyzed for the purposes of gathering a greater understanding of human interest 
in a geographical space.9  
The predictive capacity of social media has been researched for some time now. 
Many researchers have been able to show that trends can be used to predict real-world 
                                                 
6 Ian Tunnicliffe and Steve Tatham, Social Media—The Vital Ground: Can We Hold It? (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2017), 8. 
7 “The Top 500 Sites on the Web,” Alexa Internet, Inc., accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites. 
8 “#numbers,” Twitter, accessed February 14, 2017, http://about.twitter.com. 
9 Sheng Yu and Subhash Kak, A Survey of Prediction Using Social Media (Stillwater, OK: 
Department of Computer Science, Oklahoma State University, 2012), 1. 
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outcomes.10 These studies were primarily conducted in Western/First World markets 
with predictive analysis focused on market trends or election results. There has been 
relatively little work centered in the third world populations, who experienced the highest 
rates of smartphone and Internet growth in recent years, and even less with a focus on 
conflict prediction.11 However, there has been some research on this very topic, and it is 
on this research we wish to build. A 2016 Naval Postgraduate thesis titled “Assessing 
Sentiment In Conflict Zones Through Social Media” was published comparing Yemeni 
polling data to social media trends.12 The authors compared “geographically anchored 
polling and social media data, utilizing over 1.4 million geo-referenced messages sent 
through the Twitter network from Yemen over the period from October 2013 to January 
2014.”13 Once compiled and compared, the data was used to determine popular support 
for extremist groups and support for the Yemeni government and concluded that social 
media data can be a used for evaluating popular support under certain conditions.14  
There are many different ways to measure local sentiment ranging from keyword 
spotting to lexical analysis.15 In addition to these, the U.S. military has its own methods 
of analysis to provide intelligence to decision makers. Within the U.S. Army, the primary 
role of intelligence is to provide, “Commanders and decision makers with the requisite 
information facilitating their situational understanding so that they may successfully 
                                                 
10 Sitaram Asur and Bernardo A. Huberman, “Predicting the Future with Social Media,” in 2010 
IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT) 
1 (August–September 2010): 492–499, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5616710/; Brendan O’Connor 
et al., “From Tweets to Polls: Linking Text Sentiment to Public Opinion Time Series,” in Proceedings of 
the International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media 11, no. 122–129 (Washington, DC: 
2010), 1–2; Spyros E. Polykalas, George N. Prezerakos, and Agisilaos Konidaris, “An Algorithm Based on 
Google Trends’ Data for Future Prediction. Case study: German Elections,” in 2013 IEEE International 
Symposium on Signal Processing and Information Technology (December 2013): 69–73, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6781856/. 
11 Tunnicliffe and Tatham, Social Media—The Vital Ground, 8. 
12 Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict Zones through Social Media.” 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Erik Cambria et al., “New Avenues in Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis,” IEEE Intelligent 




accomplish their missions in full spectrum operations.”16 Social Network Analysis is one 
of the primary methods used by the military and correlates the number and strength of 
links between persons of interest and threat groups.17 Although this method can produce 
results at the operational and tactical level regarding targets of interest, the benefit of 
open source sentiment gathering through social media is often overlooked which could 
assist commanders in understanding their operational environment.18   
When it comes to the U.S. military, there is always an urgent and ever-present 
need to understand the operational environment, but some commanders and military 
leaders are skeptical of social media analysis.19 In a 2011 White Paper titled “Strategic 
Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills,” written by the commanders of the U.S. Army, 
Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command, the commanders recognized that the 
United States has engaged in conflicts without understanding the physical, cultural, and 
social factors of the operational environment.20 Their proposed solution to better 
understand these factors is through strategically deployed forces that can interact with 
foreign governments, militaries, and populations because they claim the only reliable 
means of assessing how people will act is through human to human contact.21 However, 
in areas denied to U.S. forces and government agencies, the U.S. generally relies on 
human intelligence and other technical means to provide understanding of the “human 
domain.”  
While academia continues to build the link between social media and local 
sentiment, mostly for marketing and opinion polling, these methods have only begun to 
be extended to developing countries, much less today’s conflict-ridden operational 
                                                 
16 Department of the Army, Intelligence, FM 2-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, May 
2004), 1–1. 
17 John Scott, Social Network Analysis (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012). 
18 Department of the Army, Intelligence, 1-1. 
19 Tunnicliffe and Tatham, Social Media—The Vital Ground, viii. 
20 James F. Amos, William H. McRaven, and Raymond Odierno, “Strategic Landpower: Winning the 
Clash of Wills” (white paper, United States Army, United States Marine Corps and the United States 
Special Operations Command, 2013), 8. 
21 Ibid. 
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environments.22 Although the majority of military intelligence tasks focus on current or 
potential threats, methods of understanding the leanings of an entire population within an 
operational environment could alert commanders to potential events or activities that 
would change the nature of operations and the initiation of prompt and appropriate 
action.23 The knowledge available through social media metadata analysis directly 
supports the U.S. Army Intelligence Mission Essential Task of Support to Strategic 
Responsiveness, which “centers on providing information and intelligence to the 
commander, which facilitates his achieving understanding of the enemy and the 
environment.”24 While multiple sources of information gathering are required to paint 
the most accurate picture, failing to analyze the leanings of a population at large limits 
the understanding of threat groups who often share the same cultural and religious 
experiences as the “disaffected portions of the populations where partnerships are most 
critical.”25 In addition to understanding a particular threat group, social media analysis 
could provide better insights into the demographic dimension of Military Intelligence 
which includes the “cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup of a given region, nation, or 
                                                 
22 Apoorv Agarwal et al., “Sentiment Analysis of Twitter Data,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on 
Languages in Social Media, eds. Meena Nagarajan and Michael Gamon (Association for Computational 
Linguistics, 2011), 30–38; Younggue Bae and Hongchul Lee, “Sentiment Analysis of Twitter Audiences: 
Measuring the Positive or Negative Influence of Popular Twitterers,” Journal of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology 63, no. 12 (2012): 2521–2535; Johan Bollen, Alberto Pepe, and Huina 
Mao, “Modeling Public Mood and Emotion: Twitter Sentiment and Socio-Economic Phenomena,” in 
Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, eds. N. Nicolov 
and J. G. Shanahan (Barcelona, Spain: AAAI Press, July 2011), 1–10; M. Ghiassi, J. Skinner, and D. 
Zimbra, “Twitter Brand Sentiment Analysis: A Hybrid System Using N-Gram Analysis and Dynamic 
Artificial Neural Network,” Expert Systems with Applications 40, no. 16 (2013): 6266–6282; Long Jiang et 
al., “Target-Dependent Twitter Sentiment Classification,” in Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies 1 (Stroudsburg, PA: 
Association for Computational Linguistics, 2011), 151–160; Lewis Mitchell et al., “The Geography of 
Happiness: Connecting Twitter Sentiment and Expression, Demographics, and Objective Characteristics of 
Place,” PLOS ONE 8, no. 5 (2013): e64417, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0064417; O’Connor et al., 
“From Tweets to Polls”; Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict Zones through 
Social Media”; Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence”; Meena Nagarajan, Amit Sheth, and Selvam 
Velmurugan, “Citizen Sensor Data Mining, Social Media Analytics and Development Centric Web 
Applications,” in Proceedings of the 20th International Conference Companion on World Wide Web 
(ACM, 2011); A. Feller et al., “Divided They Tweet: The Network Structure of Political Microbloggers and 
Discussion Topics,” in Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social 
Media, ed. N. Nicolov and J. G. Shanahan (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press, 2011). 
23 Department of the Army, Intelligence, 1-6. 
24 Ibid., 1-3. 
25 Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict Zones through Social Media,” 2. 
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non-state actor.”26 Population trends expressed through social media could not only 
illuminate threat group propensities but also provide commanders with information on 
individuals or groups that are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. Where coalitions are 
critical, understanding who might be a potential ally and who might be persuadable 
increases the potential for organic solutions to a particular problem set.  
B. CONFLICT PREDICTION 
Just as social media analysis continues to evolve, conflict prediction remains a 
highly researched topic. Resent research has sought to combine the behavioral and 
computer sciences to more effectively predict human behavior.27 Applied behavior 
analysis (ABA) has been used to suppress malicious behavior by reinforcing appropriate 
behavior. This method establishes a baseline during clinical observations of antecedent 
response and seeks to predict and change those responses through consequences at the 
individual level.28 In 2012, the ABA method was expanded to a global method of 
behavior prediction known as automated behavior analysis, which used computer 
technology to establish a baseline of worldwide events and how they affected the 
behavior of larger groups and even the collective behavior of a country.29 To use this 
method effectively in expanded environments requires a six step process where past 
events which demonstrate the behavior you need to predict and the subdivision of 
antecedent and consequence sections are inputted into a database with numerical 
values.30 The values for both antecedent and consequence columns then determine what 
behavior might occur based on previous events in a particular location. This method 
along with many other predictive statistical modeling methods relies heavily on choosing 
the correct antecedents to predict a particular response. Although the inclusion of 
automated assists aided prediction in a wide variety of threat domains, the process is still 
                                                 
26 Department of the Army, Intelligence, 1-25. 
27 Gary Jackson, Predicting Malicious Behavior: Tools and Techniques for Ensuring Global Security, 
1st ed. (Indianapolis, IN: John Wiley and Sons, 2012), xxix. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., xxxi. 
30 Ibid., 480. 
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time-consuming and fails to use the sentiment shared through open source networks such 
as social media.31  
Spatial-temporal models have also proved effective in the statistical prediction of 
conflict. By utilizing in-sample conflict data to establish trends over time and space, 
researchers observed spatial units until a certain time and used that information to predict 
subsequent conflict.32 During a 1992–1995 case study on Bosnia using spatial-temporal 
modeling, research showed that conflict displays a strong spatial and temporal 
dependence which improved predictive performances across examined scenarios.33 This 
research method introduced mathematical simulations in addition to observational data.34 
By using historical geo-referenced conflict data and the inclusion of information about 
neighboring communities, the prediction and understanding of conflict was improved.35 
While utilizing mathematical modeling for conflict prediction, studies have also 
shown that statistical significance as a primary goal can be counterproductive. In a 2010 
article on predicting civil conflicts, the authors argued, “too much attention has been paid 
to finding statistically significant relationships, while too little attention has been paid to 
finding variables that improve our ability to predict civil war.”36 By conducting a side-
by-side comparison of two models of civil war, this article demonstrated that statistical 
significance as the only metric for variable utilization can be misleading by ignoring the 
predictive attributes of the underlying models.37 This realization will force variation in 
model specification to ensure that the findings highlighted in this research are not simply 
based on statistical significance, but on whether or not they improve predictive accuracy.  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 481. 
32 Nils B. Weidmann and Michael D. Ward, “Predicting Conflict in Space and Time,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 54, no. 6 (2010): 883–901, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25780759. 
33 Ibid., 899. 
34 Ibid., 884. 
35 Ibid., 885. 
36 Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin M. Bakke, “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: 




C. METHODOLOGY SYNTHESIS 
As social media analysis continues to provide applicable insight into social 
leanings and conflict prediction methods become more critical, the synthesis of these 
predictive research methods is critical to understanding the mechanisms underlying 
human social and violent interactions.38 Insight into population sentiment and the 
horizontal links created by social media could provide a more comprehensive conflict 
prediction capability.39 In 2015, similar conflict data and social media research 
discovered significant correlations between geographic regions with higher cellular 
penetration and rates of conflict.40 This research showed that interaction across the 
cellular medium of communication increased the likelihood of higher rates of violence 
within African states. Findings presented by Pierskalla and Florian (2013) further showed 
that “cell phone coverage has a significant and substantive effect on the probability of 
conflict occurrence” throughout the continent of Africa.41 These findings contradict a 
similar study conducted in Iraq from 2004–2009. Shapiro and Weidmann (2015) 
concluded that increased mobile communications reduced the violent acts committed by 
insurgent groups both at the district and local level within Iraq.42 Pierskalla and Florian 
(2013) explain that the likely reason for this contradiction is due to the context of 
political violence in African states when compared to the conflict in Iraq during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.43 In Iraq, with the aid of the U.S. military, government forces 
had a superior technological capability than that of many African forces. Therefore, these 
articles show that the technological capability of actors in a given conflict can alter 
whether or not cell phone coverage expansion is advantageous.  
                                                 
38 Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence.” 
39 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 297–311. 
40 Ibid., 306. 
41 Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of 
Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 
(2013): 207–24, doi:10.1017/S0003055413000075. 
42 Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, “Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword? Cellphones and 
Insurgent Violence in Iraq,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 247–274. 
43 Pierskalla and Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action.” 
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These findings must be taken into consideration as this research focuses on a 
geographical space where cellular penetration alone might not be predictive of a 
particular threat group’s level of violence. Due to this reality, the use of a lexicon to 
determine sentiment will provide an additional metric to understand violence over and 
above the effects of infrastructure and development. Along these lines, a 2016 Naval 
Postgraduate School research paper utilized specific nationalist and separatist lexicons 
within Nigeria to achieve additional predictive leverage over likely and unlikely locations 
of conflict.44 This research found a statistically significant relationship between areas 
with higher violent discourse through social media and areas with higher rates of 
violence.45 However, the metrics used in this paper were based exclusively on machine 
translation of English language lexicons. To expand on this research, this thesis seeks to 
determine the relationship between social media sentiment and conflict within Iraq by 
utilizing a locally-derived Arabic sentiment lexicon drawn from automated analysis of 
Arabic social media, without the need for explicit translation between English and 
Arabic.  
                                                 
44 Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence,” 1–6. 
45 Ibid., 16–17. 
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III. BACKGROUND—IRAQ 
Iraq was selected as the case study for analysis based on its strategic importance, 
sectarian violence, and use of Twitter to express sentiments. Iraq is strategically located 
between the region’s leading Sunni power, Saudi Arabia, and the dominant Shia power, 
Iran. Thus, the country’s population is largely divided between the two main sects of 
Islam, consisting of approximately 55–60 percent Shia and 40 percent Sunni.46 The 
Sunni-Shia divide dates back to 632 AD, when the death of Prophet Muhammad led to 
disagreement on the process to determine the succession of leadership for the Muslim 
faith.47 This disagreement continues to separate the Sunni and Shia followers of Islam. In 
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein’s Baath party regime, the Sunni minority controlled a 
monopoly of the government positions.48 Following the removal of Saddam Hussein and 
the Baath party in 2003, the ascension of Shia control of the government resulted in the 
marginalization of Iraqi Sunnis.49 This transfer of control from the Sunni minority to the 
Shia majority created conditions for resentment by both segments of the population. 
Complicating matters further, northern Iraq’s population is heavily dominated by ethnic 
Kurds. The Kurds have long sought an independent Kurdistan, but currently the region is 
governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government as part of the Iraqi government. 
Figure 1 illustrates the disposition of Iraq’s population by ethnic and sectarian divisions 
in 2014.  
                                                 
46 Central Intelligence Agency, “Middle East: Iraq,” in The World Fact Book 2017 (Washington, DC: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/geos/print_iz.html. 
47 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islam: Sunnis and Shiites” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2009), 1.  
48 Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004): 34–56, 
43.  
49 Fawaz A. Gerges, “ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism,” Current History 113, no. 767 (2014): 
339–343, 339.  
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Figure 1.  Iraq’s Population Density by Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions50 
In late 2012, a popular Sunni protest movement began to take hold within Iraq.51 
The protests were sparked by the arrest of Sunni aides to Rafia al-Isawi, the Iraqi Finance 
Minister.52 These arrests brought to the forefront the issue of increasing harsh treatment 
of Sunnis under the Shia-led government of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. 
The Human Rights Watch 2013 Report cited, “The number of violent civilian deaths in 
Iraq increased in 2012, for the first time since 2009.”53 This protest movement spread 
                                                 
50 Source: “Iraq’s Population Density by Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions,” Stratfor, August 10, 2014, 
accessed September 30, 2017, https://twitter.com/stratfor/status/498544417976770562?lang=en/. 
51 Kirk H. Sowell, “Maliki’s Anbar Blunder,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2014, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/15/malikis-anbar-blunder/. 
52 Ibid. 
53 “Iraq: A Broken Justice System,” Human Rights Watch, January 31, 2013, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/iraq-broken-justice-system. 
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across predominantly Sunni-populated cities in West and Northwest Iraq. These protests 
were largely divided between pro-government and anti-government demonstrations. The 
anti-government protests tended to occur in heavily Sunni populated areas, while the pro-
government protests tended to occur in heavily Shia populated areas.54 This divide 
contributed to the increased ethnic tensions and violence across Iraq.  
Opposing political views among the population reflected both negative and 
positive sentiments across the country. The perceived government directed 
marginalization and discrimination of Sunnis by Prime Minister Maliki, led to increased 
negative sentiments and protest by Sunni political and tribal leaders.55 These clashes 
escalated in Hawija on April 23, 2013, when Iraqi security forces violently suppressed a 
protest that resulted in the death of 44 protesters.56 Furthering the Sunni-Shia divide, 
Shia militias began to mobilize and increased violent suppression of Sunni populations.57 
The Sunni-Shiite divide created the conditions for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) to garner support and prosper in Sunni dominated areas. Further exploiting this 
divide, ISIS conducted vehicle borne improvised explosive device attacks targeting Iraqi 
security forces and critical infrastructure.58 ISIS attacks against the government 
supported ISIS efforts to recruit supporters with negative and hostile sentiments towards 
the Iraqi government.59  
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq reported the year 2013 as the most 
violent year in Iraq since 2008, resulting in 7,818 civilians and 1,050 Iraqi security forces 
                                                 
54 Sam Wyer, “Political Update: Mapping the Iraq Protests,” Figure 2, Institute for the Study of War, 
January 11, 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/political-update-mapping-iraq-protests. 
55 Zana K. Gulmohamad, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) ISIS,” 
Global Security Studies 5, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 4. 
56 Sowell, “Maliki’s Anbar Blunder.” 
57 Jessica D. Lewis, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part 1 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2013), 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf, 8. 
58 Ibid., 9. 
59 Gerges, “ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism,” 339. 
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killed.60 Additionally, some 17,891 Iraqis were injured as a result of violence during this 
same period.61 In December of 2013, ISIS overthrew Iraqi government control of 
Fallujah and parts of Ramadi. ISIS expansion continued throughout 2014, as the group 
captured the cities of Mosul and Tikrit in June.62 Essential to the ISIS strategy was their 
use of social media to recruit, indoctrinate, and wage psychological warfare to overthrow 
the Iraqi government’s control over vast areas.63 Around 2011, many Jihadi groups 
began a shift from posting mostly on Internet forums to mainstream social media 
platforms like Twitter and Facebook.64  
In 2014, there were an estimated 46,000-90,000 ISIS support accounts, making 
Twitter the most active social media platform for ISIS.65 A study of ISIS Twitter users 
from September 2014 to December 2014 revealed the majority of ISIS support accounts 
were geo-referenced in Syria and Iraq with accounts that often posted messages in higher 
volumes than the average Twitter account.66 Additionally, most ISIS support accounts 
had a higher number of followers than the average Twitter account.67 A study analyzing 
ISIS networks on Twitter determined the followers of an ISIS sympathizer represented 
four Twitter user categories: international mass media, regional Arabic mass media, IS 
                                                 
60 Luke Harding and Agencies in Baghdad, “Iraq Suffers Its Deadliest Year Since 2008,” Guardian, 
January 1, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/01/iraq-2013-deadliest-year-since-2008. 
61 Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, August 8, 2014, http://www.aina.org/news/20140808123646.pdf. 
62 Cameron Glenn, “Timeline: Rise and Spread of the Islamic State,” Wilson Center, July 5, 2016, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state. 
63 Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria 
and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 1 (2015): 1–22, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948. 
64 Ibid., 3. 
65 Shaun Wright et al., “Resurgent Insurgents: Quantitative Research into Jihadists Who Get 
Suspended but Return on Twitter,” Journal of Terrorism 7, no. 2 (May 2016): 1, 
http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1213. 
66 J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morga, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the 
Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter (analysis paper no. 20, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with 




fighters, and IS sympathizers.68 In practice, ISIS social media networks appealed to both 
media outlets and individuals, which enabled ISIS to rapidly project their narratives.  
For example, an ISIS sympathizer used Twitter messages referring to current 
events for propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment (Figure 2). In the figure, some of 
the messages include links to videos or “#” symbol to categorize the message for others 
to users to follow. The themes of the propaganda messages express counter-narratives 
designed to show the anti-ISIS coalition forces as liars who are incompetent and 
deliberately target civilians. In contrast, the radicalization messages seek to highlight 
recent acts of violence conducted by ISIS as a display of strength. The recruitment 
messages promote narratives that seek to inspire others to take action based on religious 
reasons. ISIS sympathizer Twitter messages like these are designed to appeal to like-
minded individuals and share sentiments regarding current events. Additionally, the 
Twitter messages include a mixture of sarcasm, inference, and words associated with 
extreme sentiments. Words such as, “awesome” or “amazing” are often associated with 
extremely positive sentiments. While words like, “massacred” are often associated with 
extremely negative sentiments. The mixture of current events, religious ideology, and 
extreme sentiments make these ISIS sympathizer’s Twitter messages more appealing to 
large audiences.  
 
                                                 
68 Akemi Takeoka Chatfield, Christopher G. Reddick, and Uuf Brajawidagda, “Tweeting Propaganda, 
Radicalization and Recruitment: Islamic State Supporters Multi-Sided Twitter Networks,” in Proceedings 
of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research (ACM, 2015), 247. 
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Figure 2.  Example of ISIS Sympathizer Twitter Messages.69  
 
 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 246.  
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IV. RESEARCH METHODS 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
Building on previous research, we intend to further increase the field’s 
understanding of the relationship between violence and social media.70 We propose to do 
this by answering the question, How can social media analysis be used as a tool for 
predicting violent events and understanding social sentiment during violent events? We 
hypothesize that negative social media sentiment tends to occur before violent acts take 
place. If a predictive relationship is found between social media metadata and historical 
databases of violent acts in Iraq, the study could provide political and military leaders a 
new method of conflict prediction and therefore increase situational awareness and 
response time at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Finally, as a secondary 
objective, we propose that correlations between social media and sentiment data within 
Yemen found in previous research can be further confirmed by conducting similar 
research within a different geographical space.71  
B. DATA AND METHODS 
1. Social Media 
The research was initiated by conducting Twitter key-word analysis to determine 
trends and sentiment within Iraq. NPS has 40 terabytes of licensed Twitter data archived 
from August 1, 2013, through July 31, 2014, that contains a randomized sample of 10% 
of the Twitter messages that appeared on Twitter during this period. In order to isolate the 
origin of the Twitter messages to Iraq, the coordinates used in our analysis are metadata, 
provided by Twitter as part of the licensed archive, which represent the coordinates of the 
self-reported hometown from each user profile. These coordinates are less reliable than 
the GPS coordinates associated with specific messages. However, these GPS coordinates 
are only available for approximately 1% of the archived data, because users must opt-in 
                                                 
70 Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict Zones through Social Media”; 
Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence.” 
71 Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict Zones through Social Media.” 
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to allow them to be collected. In contrast, the profile-based geo-coordinates are available 
for approximately 30 percent of the records in the NPS archive. Using this method, from 
August 1, 2013, through July 31, 2014, the we find that the NPS archive has geo-
referenced within Iraq an average of nearly 2,300 tweets per day. We believe this is an 
acceptable rate as a recently completed NPS thesis focused on Yemen using similar 
volumes of data.72  
2. Sentiment Dictionary 
Over the past few years, researchers have developed many English sentiment 
lexicons for web content analysis. However, the development of Arabic-specific 
sentiment lexicons remains limited. The difficulty of developing Arabic specific 
sentiment lexicons is caused in part by the fundamental differences in regional dialects 
(Egyptian, Levantine, Gulf, Maghrebi, Iraqi, Yemenite, etc.) spoken and used by 
individuals, and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), the only formally taught written 
language of the Arab world.73 Compounding the difficulty is the mixture of dialects to 
create a new unique and highly-regionalized dialect. For instance, Iraqi Arabic uses both 
a combination of Gulf and Levantine dialects. Furthermore, while using social media, 
people often use slang words, words from their regional dialect, or social media specific 
characters to express their sentiments instead of formal writing standards.74 Due to these 
nuanced issues, we selected the Large-Scale Twitter-Specific Arabic Sentiment Lexicon 
(AraSenTi) for our analysis, because the AraSenti lexicon specifically focuses on the use 
of informal Arabic language found on Twitter.75 
The AraSenTi Lexicon is a robust lexicon generated through a hybrid approach, 
combining Arabic tweet-specific words and a Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI) 
corpus that measures the strength of word associations with positive, neutral, and 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Gehad S. Kaseb and Mona F. Ahmed, “Arabic Sentiment Analysis Approaches: An Analytical 
Survey,” International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research 7, no. 10 (October 2016): 712. 
74 Nora Al-Twairesh, Hend Al-Khalifa, and AbdulMalik Al-Salman, “AraSenTi: Large-Scale Twitter-
Specific Arabic Sentiment Lexicons,” Proceedings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics (Berlin, Germany: August 7–12, 2016), 697. 
75 Ibid. 
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negative datasets of tweets.76 The lexicon consists of a total of 225,276 Arabic words 
with assigned values for individual words varying from -8 to 8. These values are based on 
whether the word was associated with a positive, neutral, or negative co-occurring text.77 
Words with values closer to -8 are deemed associated with extremely negative 
sentiments, while words with values closer to 8 are deemed associated with extremely 
positive sentiments. Words with values closer to zero are deemed associated with neutral 
or mixed sentiments. Due to the challenges associated with generating Arabic specific 
lexicons, we believe AraSenTi-PMI was the appropriate lexicon for our research. The 
Arabic tweet-specific hybrid approach to lexicon generation specifically addresses the 
nuances of data mining Iraqi tweets, while providing an automated means of quantifying 
positive and negative sentiments. 
Another challenge of social media analysis in general is that the demographics 
associated with social media use tend to be younger, wealthier and urban.78 With this 
acknowledged, our research attempts to show that violence done by anyone, tweeter or 
not, will be reflected in Twitter sentiment. A link established between Twitter and 
violence will be a link nonetheless, regardless of demographics, and provide potential for 
future analysis and prediction. To further reduce the potential for a spurious connection, 
we have also chosen several control variables associated with demographic and 
infrastructure development datasets, as will be discussed further below. 
3. Analysis Framework 
For this research, our analysis is based on a spatial-temporal frame. To start, all 
our variables are spatially isolated to the borders of Iraq as derived from the “CShapes” 
dataset that provides historical maps of state boundaries and capitals in the post-World 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 701. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Stephen Ansolabehere and Eitan Hersh, “Validation: What Big Data Reveal about Survey 
Misreporting and the Real Electorate,” Political Analysis 20, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 437–459, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23359641; Pablo Barberá and Gonzalo Rivero, “Understanding the Political 
Representativeness of Twitter Users,” Social Science Computer Review 33, no. 6 (December 1, 2015): 712–
729; Alan Mislove et al., “Understanding the Demographics of Twitter Users,” in Proceedings of the Fifth 
International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (AAAI Press, 2011), 554–557. 
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War II period.79 We further restrict our variables by timeframe to match the timespan of 
our available Twitter data, from August 1st, 2013 to July 31st, 2014. To allow for proper 
geospatial analysis, we created a by calendar month grid covering Iraq at an interval of 
two-kilometer squares and then overlaid our variables to allow for a uniform unit of 
analysis. This method will allow for equivalent aggregation and comparison for both our 
dependent and independent variables, as well as our control variables.  
4. Dependent Variable 
As a starting point, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event 
Dataset (UCDP GED) has a collection of geo-referenced data on individual acts of armed 
violence in conflicts since 1989. This data provides a means to analyze correlation 
between social media trends and violent events, by recording the date and location of 
deadly events occurring in the context of armed conflicts.80 The unit of analysis in the 
raw dataset is an event, defined as “an incident where armed force was [used] by an 
organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 
direct death at a specific location and a specific date.”81 The raw UCDP GED dataset 
contains 128,264 events collected globally (excluding Syria) from January 1st, 1989 to 
December 31st, 2015, with the best spatial resolution of a fully geocoded individual 
village and the best temporal resolution of a day.82  
For this research, this dataset was first isolated to the borders of Iraq, then 
stripped of all entries that did not have a location confidence greater than or equal to 
second level administrative division (for Iraq, the 102 “kaza” districts).83 These events 
were then binned into monthly event counts starting with the first month of our Twitter 
                                                 
79 Nils B. Weidmann, Doreen Kuse, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “The Geography of the 
International System: The CShapes Dataset,” International Interactions 36, no. 1 (2010): 86–106. 
80 Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset,” 
Journal of Peace Research 50, no.4 (2013): 523–532. 
81 Mihai Croicu and Ralph Sundberg, “UCDP GED Codebook Version 5.0” (Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2016). 
82 Sundberg and Melander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”; Croicu and 
Sundberg, “UCDP GED Codebook Version 5.0.” 
83 Ibid.; “Iraq Districts,” Humanitarian Information Centre for Iraq, accessed on October 25, 2017, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/images/013_A4_Iraq_Districts.jpg. 
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data, August 2013 through July 2014, and then overlaid on the established two-kilometer 
grid. This scoping identified 926 geo-referenced violent events inside our spatial-
temporal grid, which will be used as our dependent variable, Violent Events. Our research 
hypothesizes a positive relationship between negative sentiments expressed in social 
media messages and subsequent rates of violent events. While this association appears 
intuitive, careful quantitative analysis will be required to determine whether it can be 
confirmed as a base for further research.  
Figures 3 presents a visual representation of the UCDP GED geo-referenced 
observations (A) and their density (B). The raw observations are shown on the left, with 
each mark indicating a violent event within our analysis timeframe, totaling 926 events 
over 12 months. The heat map shows the density of these observations with red showing 
heavy density tapering to yellow showing less dense observations. The highest density of 
Violent Events occurs in and around Baghdad, the nation’s capital, located roughly in the 
center of Iraq. We can also see that the pattern of violence in Iraq appear to correspond to 
high population centers and major roads.  
 
Figure 3.  Violent Events Geo-referenced (A) and Density of Violent Events (B) 
in Iraq, August 2013–July 2014 
 22 
5. Independent Variable 
Our independent variables were derived from the comparison of two datasets: the 
previously described AraSenTi lexicon, and a historical archive of Twitter messages. The 
Twitter dataset is comprised of a NPS-licensed, random 10 percent cross-section of 
global Twitter posts from August 1st, 2013 through July 31st, 2014. The raw Twitter 
dataset contains over 40 terabytes of public messages and associated metadata. To 
facilitate the computation of such a large data set, we utilize a highly-parallelized, in-
memory database application developed at NPS to speed computation.84  
The comparison of these two datasets is used to derive our base sentiment data 
and is used to create the independent variables of Total Twitter Messages, Negative 
Twitter Messages and Extremely Negative Twitter Messages. Our research breaks each of 
these variables into calendar-month counts that are then geo-referenced to our already 
established two-kilometer grid for model analysis. 
Total Twitter Messages is the count of all Twitter messages geo-referenced within 
Iraq’s spatial-temporal area, yielding a raw corpus of Twitter messages totaling 829,537 
observations. This variable serves as our baseline independent variable for contrast to the 
next two more restrictive independent variables. Figure 4 is a visual representation of 
Total Twitter Messages and their corresponding density. The heat map illustrates the 
density of these observations with red showing heavier density tapering to yellow 
showing less dense observations. The density and location of Total Twitter Messages 
across Iraq are similar to the Violent Events in Figure 3, with the densest locations 
occurring near high population centers and near roads.  
                                                 
84 Warren, “Mapping the Rhetoric of Violence.” 
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Figure 4.  Total Twitter Messages Geo-referenced (A) and Density of Total 
Twitter Messages (B) in Iraq, August 2013–July 2014 
Negative Twitter Messages isolates the independent variable to counting those 
messages containing negative sentiment terms, as identified by the AraSenTi lexicon, 
representing a total of 117,018 observations. Extremely Negative Messages further 
narrows the independent variable to counting messages containing terms in the top 0.1 
percent (an AraSenTi score of >5.833 or <-6.153) of the distribution of negative 
sentiment terms identified in the AraSenTi lexicon, reflecting messages at the highest 
level of negative sentiment. While yielding a smaller dataset of only 1740 total messages, 
these tweets contain the most extreme terms identified by the lexicon, and therefore may 
provide greater levels of confidence in the assessment of spatial patterns of negative 
sentiments.  
6. Control Variables 
Our control variables center around demographic and infrastructure information. 
These variables were included to ensure that the relationships observed between the 
dependent and independent variables were not simply a result of economic development, 
population density or existing infrastructure in a geographical space.  
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a. Road Distance 
The control variable Road Distance is derived from the Global Roads Open Access Data 
Set (gROADSv1) from the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). This 
provides a well-documented global dataset of roads between population centers which is 
geospatially referenced. We incorporated the data by measuring the distance from a 
gridded cell to the nearest recorded road segment.85 The dataset has been continually 
updated from the 1980s to 2010 and spatial accuracy varies. The Iraq subset used in our 
research contains 160,000 kilometers of georeferenced roads, primarily taken from the 
National Imagery and Map Agency (NIMA) in 2003 at 100k resolution.86 Figure 5 shows 
the dataset when laid onto our 2-km grid with green representing the road networks of 
Iraq for the year 2010, the most current year available for our area. 
 
Figure 5.   Road Density in Iraq, 2010 
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b. Night Light 
The control variable Night Light measures nighttime light emissions by utilizing 
the Version 4 Defense Meteorological Satellite Program-Operational Linescan System 
(DMSP-OLS) Nighttime Lights Time Series dataset. These datasets are collected in 30 
arc second grids via four sun-synchronous satellites to display global light emissions for 
the years 1992–2013. The data is collected on the individual light emission basis and then 
filtered for percent frequency of detection to normalize the variation in cloud-free 
persistent light observations. Our specific dataset was collected from satellite F18 in 
2013, the most recent data available for our region.87 Light emissions are a hallmark 
indicator of urbanization and as such will allow for our research to further control for 
urbanization as a factor for any link found between violence and Twitter sentiment.88 
Figure 6 shows the 2013 level of light emissions with dark to light scaling, yellow/white 
showing the highest levels of night light emissions down to the dark blue/black area of 
little to no light emissions. 
 
Figure 6.   Light Emissions in Iraq, 2013 
                                                 
87 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, “DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time 
Series,” National Geophysical Data Center, Boulder, CO, last modified June 7, 2017, 
http://noaa.maps.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=78147366ebac4f28862053b89169dfc9. 
88 Marc L. Imhoff et al., “A Technique for Using Composite DMSP/OLS ‘City Lights’ Satellite Data 
to Map Urban Area,” Remote Sensing of Environment 61, no. 3 (1997): 361–370; Ting Ma et al., 
“Quantitative Estimation of Urbanization Dynamics Using Time Series of DMSP/OLS Nighttime Light 
Data: A Comparative Case Study from China’s Cities,” Remote Sensing of Environment 124 (2012): 99–
107. 
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c. Population Density 
This control variable models the distribution of human population throughout the globe 
and was derived from Columbia University’s Center of International Earth Science 
Information Network’s (CIESIN) dataset titled Gridded Population of the World 
(GPWv4). This dataset is collected and updated yearly starting in 1995 with accuracy at 
approximately 1 km at the equator.89 Our data from the GPWv4 dataset was pulled from 
the most current year available for Iraq, 2010. Historically, levels of population density 
and urban development have been linked to a positive influence on violence.90 This 
control variable will allow our research to see if this is a contributing factor to any link 
that is seen between violence and Twitter sentiment. 
d. Previous Violent Events and Deaths 
Also derived from the UCDP GED dataset are four control variables designed to 
account for the recent history of violent events in a particular spatial region. The first two 
variables, Violent Events (1 Month Lag) and Violent Events (2 Month Lag) record lagged 
counts of the total number of violent events in a grid-cell at temporal distances of 1 and 2 
months respectively. The second two variables, Deaths (1 Month Lag) and Deaths (2 
Month Lag), record the sum of the death totals associated with each of the violent events 
in Violent Events. These variables are derived from the best (most likely) estimate of total 
deaths involved for the event, whether combatant or civilian, again at lags of 1 and 2 
months respectively, and are included to control for the severity of recent violence at a 
given location. The mean death value for each violent event is 1.61 deaths, ranging from 
a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 906.  
                                                 
89 Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University, “Documentation 
for the Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4)” (Palisades NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data 
and Applications Center (SEDAC), 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.7927/H4D50JX4. 
90 Robert Muggah, Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence 
(International Development Research Centre, 2012); John D. McCarthy, Omer R. Galle, and William 
Zimmern, “Population Density, Social Structure, and Interpersonal Violence: An Intermetropolitan Test of 
Competing Models,” American Behavioral Scientist 18, no. 6 (1975): 771–789. 
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C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Negative Binomial regression models were used due to our dependent variable 
being a count of violent events, with a unit of analysis given by 2km grid cell-months. All 
independent variables were logged prior to regression analysis to adjust for heavy-tailed 
distributions.91 All time-varying independent variables were lagged by one month, and 
each variable was then aggregated into the 2km grid cells as described above. The results 
from these models are presented in Chapter V (see Table 1). 
  
                                                 
91 William H. Greene, “Accounting for Excess Zeros and Sample Selection in Poisson and Negative 
Binomial Regression Models” (working paper, New York University Stern School of Business, 1994); 
Joseph M. Hilbe, Negative Binomial Regression (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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V. RESULTS 
Four regression models (Table 1) were used to examine the predictive relationship 
between Violent Events in Iraq and messages sent through the Twitter network. 
Additionally, seven independent control variables were selected to ensure against 
spurious relationships. The first model demonstrates the relationship between the seven 
control variables and Violent Events. The second model builds on the first model and 
includes a measure of the total number of observed Twitter messages to establish whether 
including message volume in the model results in a better fit for predictive analysis. The 
third model builds on the second model and includes Negative Twitter Messages, the total 
volume of the previous month’s negative messages. The fourth model replaces the 
independent variable, Negative Twitter Messages, used in the third model, and instead 
uses the independent variable, Extremely Negative Twitter Messages, which is drawn 
only from the most extreme terms in the lexicon. This enabled us to determine if Twitter 
messages associated with extreme sentiment produced more statistically significant 
results.  
The results of the models produced three noteworthy findings. Finding one shows 
that aggregate rates of Twitter messaging activity matter for predicting violence. In 
regions of Iraq with higher rates of Twitter messages, lower rates of violence tended to 
occur in subsequent months. When the total volume of Twitter messages is included as a 
variable in the second model, the AIC score improved, which indicates a better fit for 
predictive analysis. The second finding indicates that measurements of negative 
sentiment can improve the accuracy of violence prediction, beyond the predictions 
generated by aggregate message volume. More specifically, we find a negative 
relationship between Twitter messages containing negative sentiments and the 
subsequent amount of observed violence (Model 3 and Model 4). This relationship is the 
opposite of what was hypothesized and is counter-intuitive to the results that were 
expected. Finding three reveals that extreme sentiment matters even more. Extremely 
Negative Twitter Messages (Model 4) proved to have a higher statistical significance than 
Negative Twitter Messages (Model 3) and generates the best fit for predictive analysis 
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(lowest AIC score). Interestingly, this fourth model also indicates that the count of 
Extremely Negative Twitter Messages has a statistically significant negative coefficient, 
contrary to our hypothesis. The improved predictive successes of Model 4 may also 
indicate that the use of higher veracity words for lexical analysis may produce more 
accurate predictive models. 
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Table 1.   Regression Models 
 Dependent Variable: Violent Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Negative Twitter Messages (Full Lexicon) (1 Month Lag)   -0.218
*  
   (0.119)  
     Extremely Negative Twitter Messages (Top 0.1% of Lexicon) 
 (1 Month Lag)    -0.385
*** 
    (0.136) 
     Total Twitter Messages (1 Month Lag)  -0.071
* 0.089 -0.006 
  (0.040) (0.098) (0.048) 
     Road Distance -0.281* -0.276* -0.277* -0.273* 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.149) 
     Night Light 1.277*** 1.328*** 1.254*** 1.209*** 
 (0.151) (0.154) (0.160) (0.159) 
     Population Density -0.148*** -0.130** -0.127** -0.083 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) 
     Deaths (1 Month Lag) 0.519*** 0.474*** 0.464*** 0.463*** 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.154) 
     Deaths (2 Month Lag) 0.603*** 0.575*** 0.547*** 0.546*** 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.128) (0.127) 
     Violent Events (1 Month Lag) -0.503 -0.400 -0.327 -0.300 
 (0.379) (0.380) (0.383) (0.376) 
     Violent Events (2 Month Lag) 0.315 0.437* 0.484** 0.479** 
 (0.218) (0.227) (0.229) (0.226) 
     Constant -8.281*** -8.454*** -8.301*** -8.308*** 
 (0.524) (0.541) (0.545) (0.541) 
      Observations 13,836 13,836 13,836 13,836 
Log Likelihood -975.350 -973.924 -972.469 -970.264 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,966.700 1,965.848 1,964.937 1,960.529 
 Note: *p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Logarithmic transformation applied to all independent variables. 
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A. FINDING ONE—TWITTER MATTERS 
Model 1 demonstrates the relationship between the seven independent variables 
and the dependent variable, Violent Events. These seven independent variables are used 
as control variables. In the model, most control variables acted as expected. The variable 
for Road Distance resulted in a negative coefficient, indicating the greater distance from 
a road results in less violence. The variable for Night Light resulted in a significant 
positive coefficient, signifying that violent events occur more frequently in developed 
areas corresponding to high nighttime light emissions. The variables Deaths (1 Month 
Lag) and Deaths (2 Month Lag) both produced significant positive coefficients, 
indicating that violence tends to follow in the wake of violence. The only exception to 
these expectations was the variable for Population Density, which produced a significant 
negative coefficient, meaning that in more populated areas, less violence occurred. 
However, this may be generated by collinearity between population density and our other 
measures of infrastructure. In addition, the independent variable for Violent Events (1 
Month Lag) resulted in a negative coefficient, while the independent variable for Violent 
Events (2 Month Lag) produced a positive coefficient, indicating the length of a lag 
period makes a difference in predictive analysis regarding Violent Events in a month-long 
temporal periods. Model 1 serves as a baseline for the predictive analysis of the number 
of Violent Events across Iraq.  
Model 2 expands on Model 1 by including Total Twitter Messages as an 
independent variable. This variable assesses the volume of Twitter messages as a means 
for predictive analysis rather than the type of sentiment observed in the Twitter message. 
The coefficient for Total Twitter Messages is negative and statistically significant. This 
relationship implies that regions of Iraq that produce higher rates of Twitter messages 
tended to produce lower rates of violent events. Including Total Tweets into the model 
resulted in a lower AIC score between Model 1 and Model 2 by the difference of 0.852. 
This indicates that including Total Twitter Messages as a variable in the equation 
generates a better fit for predictive analysis.  
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B. FINDING TWO—NEGATIVE SENTIMENT IMPROVES PREDICTIONS 
Model 3 compares the rate of Negative Twitter Messages (Full Lexicon) (1 Month 
Lag) to Violent Events while also including the seven control variables and Total Twitter 
Messages. In the model, Negative Twitter Messages resulted in a moderately significant 
negative coefficient (p < 0.1). This indicates that the spatial regions in Iraq with Negative 
Twitter Messages in a particular month tend to be the same spatial regions that are less 
likely to experience violence in the following month. Additionally, the model produced a 
better fit than previous models. The difference between AIC scores in Model 2 and 
Model 3 resulted in a lower AIC score by 0.911. This indicates a better fit for predictive 
analysis when Negative Twitter Messages is used as the independent variable.  
C. FINDING THREE—EXTREME SENTIMENT MATTERS MORE 
Model 4 produced the best fit for predictive analysis compared to the other 
models. The negative and highly significant coefficient for Extremely Negative Twitter 
Messages (Top 0.1% Lexicon) (1 Month Lag) resulted in a p-value of p < 0.01. This 
indicates a highly significant factor in the results for predicting Violent Events. The AIC 
value also resulted in the lowest score of all the models. The AIC score for Model 4 is 
considerably lower than Model 3 by a difference of 4.408 points. Model 4 thus 
outperforms Model 2 and Model 3, both in terms of statistical significance and in terms 
of predictive success in analyzing the relationship between Twitter messages and 
violence. This indicates that using the most extreme subset of negative sentiment terms 
for lexical analysis produced statistically more accurate results than using the full 
AraSenTi Lexicon set of negative sentiment terms. 
A visualization of the negative binomial regression results for Model 4 (Figure 9. 
A-F) demonstrates how each statistically significant independent variable impacts the 
expected value of the dependent variable (Violent Events), when all other variables in 
Model 4 remain fixed at their means. This method allows us to isolate the independent 
variables and visually understand their effects in the model. The Y-axis on each figure is 
the expected outcome in terms of number of Violent Events in a grid cell-month. The X-
axis shows a shift in the independent variable from its minimum to maximum value. The 
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red line in the visualizations is the prediction line, which demonstrates how the expected 
number of Violent Events changes as a function of the independent variables. The line’s 
slope indicates either a negative or a positive relationship of the independent variable in 
relation to Violent Events. The grey portions around the prediction line represent the 95 
percent confidence interval of the prediction.  
For example, Road Distance (p < 0.1) (Figure 9A) demonstrates a negative 
relationship to Violent Events. Essentially, the further away from a road, the less amount 
of violence is expected to occur. This is intuitive, as the rural desert terrain of Iraq would 
likely cause less people to interact the further away people get from a road. The 
independent variable Night Light (p < 0.01) (Figure 9B) illustrates a highly significant 
positive relationship to Violent Events. At zero levels of Night Light, we see an expected 
count of Violent Events close to zero, but once the Night Light variable is increased to its 
maximum value the expected number of Violent Events increases towards 0.03. This 
relationship is also intuitive. In rural areas with low emissions of Night Light, people are 
likely to interact less and Violent Events are less likely to occur. Violent Events (2 Month 
Lag) (p < 0.05) (Figure 9C), also has a positive effect on the expected count of Violent 
Events. Both Deaths (1 Month Lag) (p < 0.01) (Figure 9D) and Deaths (2 Month Lag) 
(p < 0.01) (Figure 9E) also show highly significant positive effects.  
Most importantly, the visualization for Extremely Negative Twitter Messages (Top 
0.1% Lexicon) (1 Month Lag) (p < 0.01) (Figure 9F) illustrates the negative and highly 
significant effect on the expected count of Violent Events. Moving from the zero level of 
Extremely Negative Twitter Messages to the maximum value, the expected level of 
Violent Events significantly decreases by nearly 80 percent. This counter-intuitive 
relationship between Extremely Negative Twitter Messages and Violent Events is the 
opposite of our hypothesis. This represents a noteworthy finding for understanding 
violence through social media, because if our intuitive understanding of the relationship 
between sentiments and violence in a conflict zone is fundamentally wrong, then further 
research in this field is required.  
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Figure 7.  Predicted Effects of Statistically Significant Regression Variables 
(Model 4) 
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VI. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
Our efforts have also identified four areas of potential future research. These 
research areas involve expanding on the lexicon and threats discussed in this thesis in 
addition to replicating the research methods used in other operational areas of interest.  
A. SENTIMENT FOLLOWING VIOLENT EVENTS 
Additional research is required to determine sentiment following violent events. 
Understanding the leanings of various population groups following a specific violent 
event could illuminate who a population tends to blame for events and whether that 
coincides with the facts on the ground. Understanding those trends and what types of 
violent acts generate the most negative sentiment by a population could aid the U.S. in 
choosing which tools to use to prevent or mitigate the catastrophic loss of local support. 
We recommend using the same conflict data and adjusting the lexicon to build word lists 
that would determine positive and negative sentiments towards the government and non-
state actors. Our research only addressed general sentiments. It did not address whether 
there was more popular support for ISIS or the Iraqi government. ISIS occupied vast 
areas of Iraq and seized the city of Mosul with little resistance. An additional lexical 
analysis that specifically includes terms for ISIS and the Iraqi government could 
differentiate popular support during the conflict. Understanding the relationship between 
popular support and violent events could provide insight on how popular support affects 
insurgencies. 
B. DOES THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT MATTER? 
Our research found that there is a negative relationship between tweets with 
negative sentiments and the occurrence of violent events in the following month. This 
contradicts the expectations drawn from previous sentiment analysis research. We believe 
the nature of the ISIS conflict could have been responsible for this occurrence due to the 
increased usage of social media to recruit and spread pro-ISIS propaganda. The usage of 
social media by ISIS might have influenced increased social media usage by the general 
population to stay abreast of threat activities. Additional research in a different conflict 
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zone where the predominant threat group had limited or no social media utilization could 
be conducted to confirm or deny this speculation.  
C. ARABIC LEXICONS AND TWITTER 
This research utilized a large-scale, Twitter-specific Arabic sentiment lexicon. 
Arabic sentiment lexicons continue to be insufficient at addressing multiple Arabic 
dialects, as well as the nuances of sarcasm. We did not conduct human analysis to 
translate the Twitter messages to determine the accuracy of the sentiments expressed in 
the Iraqi geo-referenced tweets. Additionally, we did not conduct lexical analysis of other 
languages, to include English. Since Twitter allows users to connect across the globe, 
tweets geo-referenced in Iraq, but written in foreign languages are likely targeted towards 
international audiences and less likely towards local audiences. Furthermore, we did not 
attempt to identify Twitter bot accounts. Bot accounts are computer-generated user 
accounts designed to amplify specific messages by constantly tweeting and retweeting 
messages. It is extremely difficult to identify these accounts, but many bot accounts are 
often accounts with short life spans. Eliminating tweets from accounts with short life 
spans could serve to eliminate some of these bots. Arabic Twitter analysis continues to be 





This thesis produced three findings: (1) Measuring spatial and temporal variation 
in the volume of Twitter messages improved predictions of the timing and location of 
violent events in Iraq, (2) predictions were further enhanced by measurement of terms 
reflecting negative sentiments in local dialects, and (3) extremely negative terminology 
seems to be more useful than moderately negative terminology in generating accurate 
predictions of violent events. The thesis began by asking the research question, “How can 
social media analysis be used as a tool for predicting violent events and understanding 
social sentiment during violent events?” This research was pursued because there is a gap 
in understanding how social media sentiments are related to violent events. The research 
specifically focused on analyzing social media sentiments through Twitter messages geo-
referenced in Iraq from August 1, 2013, through July 31, 2014. Iraq was selected as the 
case study due to the high level of violence and conflict observed during this time period, 
which corresponded with ISIS violently occupying large areas of Iraq. Additionally, 
understanding how social sentiments in Iraq relate to acts of violence is important as Iraq 
continues to be strategically significant to U.S. interests and regional stability.  
To analyze Iraqi sentiment, as expressed through social media, a sentiment 
dictionary was required. Instead of translating an English lexicon to Arabic, the AraSenti 
lexicon was selected for its specific strength of including the use of informal Arabic 
language associated with Twitter messages. This lexicon enabled us to categorize Iraqi 
tweets into positive or negative sentiment categories. These tweets also provided geo-
referenced metadata, allowing us to spatially analyze the use of Arabic terminology 
across Iraq.  
This research uncovered an inverse relationship between negative sentiment and 
levels of violence, which contradicted initial assumptions. When negative words were 
used, subsequent violent events occurred at lower rates. Understanding why this occurred 
could change how we think about operations and the sentiment of a population in conflict 
zones. It may be that when violence is lower, one is be more willing to express negative 
sentiments without fear of reprisal. Another possibility lies in the difference between 
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sadness and anger-related words. It is possible that a further division of negative words 
by more specific emotional content could produce a different result. Additionally, the 
ability to express negative feelings through social media might decrease the need to 
express discontent through violence. In this instance, social media might have provided 
an emotional release of discontent that actually prevented the expression of discontent in 
more dangerous ways.  
One implication of this finding is that military commands should consider 
promoting the use and implementation of mediums where a local population can express 
discontent as an outlet to relieve pressure. Providing individuals access to social media, 
town hall meetings, and other public forums where freedom of speech is allowed could 
lower the expression of discontent through violence. Even in cultures where expression is 
restricted in public forums, social media provides an outlet that is less restrictive. 
However, because our data does not allow us to differentiate between these mechanisms, 
future research will be required to confirm or disconfirm these hypotheses.  
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